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Abstract 
In this paper I take up a commonly voiced concern about the viability of global 
governance in general, and cosmopolitan democracy in particular, namely, whether 
genuine democracy can be achieved at the international level.  Some (such as, Will 
Kymlicka) argue that genuine democracy is only possible within nation-states, 
because authentic deliberation requires common nationality or identity, which 
generates the trust and solidarity necessary to sustain deliberation and democracy.  
Through analysis of the argument and consideration of the requirements of genuine 
democracy, we can see that these concerns can be addressed.  I go on to suggest 
that the major challenge facing models of global governance is not one concerning 
lack of common identity, solidarity, or opportunities for authentic deliberation, 
rather, it lies elsewhere.  We can assess global governance arrangements in terms 
of two main variables, which are sometimes in tension: effectiveness and 
accountability.  We want systems of global governance to incorporate both 
considerations. Accountability can take the form of democratic procedures but 
alternative forms of accountability are also possible.  Furthermore, a system of 
governance that both effectively attends to people’s interests and is suitably 
accountable can certainly claim to have adequate democratic credentials on the 
“Responsive Democracy” view I discuss. 
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Introduction 
Global governance refers to the management of interests affecting residents of 
more than one state in the absence of a single body that has legitimate authority to 
enforce rules.  Arguments for the desirability of global governance often begin from 
the observation that many pressing problems have global scope, and because our 
fates are interdependent in many domains, we ought to have some institutions in 
place that can act effectively to address these.  Moreover, since we already have a 
de facto system of global governance, we ought to ensure it is fairer than it 
currently is.  We have duties to ensure a fairer system of global governance than 
our current one (it is variously argued) given our associations with others in the 
global economic order, the benefits we derive from it, the need to ensure burdens 
are more evenly shared, what all humans are owed as humans, concerns about 
power and its effects on freedom and democracy, and so forth, as I discuss 
elsewhere.1 
One of the most developed models for improving the fairness of global governance 
is that of David Held, a model he used to call “Cosmopolitan Democracy” but now 
seems to call “Global Social Democracy”.  (I continue to use the older term 
because, at this point, it is referred to in print a great deal more than the newer 
term.)  As Held’s model is, arguably, the most developed account, it has been the 
target of some of the most notable criticisms.  I begin this paper by briefly outlining 
the core features of Cosmopolitan Democracy.  I then move on to some of the 
strongest criticisms that this model has encountered — indeed that models of this 
kind are likely to encounter — namely, that authentic democracy can only be 
properly achieved in nation-states, not fora that are bigger than the boundaries of 
nation-states.  The suspicion that democracy cannot be adequately realized trans-
nationally is widespread and one that deserves some careful examination.  Some of 
the strongest versions of these arguments are made by Will Kymlicka, so it is worth 
looking at his particular account of the problems, which we do next.  Kymlicka’s 
central worry involves the absence of necessary prerequisites for democracy at the 
global level, especially concerning lack of common identity and hence, opportunities 
for authentic deliberation.  I then argue that these worries about cosmopolitan 
democracy are unfounded. 
I go on to suggest that the major challenge facing models of global governance is 
not one concerning lack of common identity or opportunities for authentic 
deliberation, rather, it lies elsewhere.  We can assess global governance 
arrangements in terms of two main variables, which are sometimes in tension: 
effectiveness and accountability.  We want systems of global governance to 
incorporate both considerations.  Accountability can sometimes take the form of 
democratic procedures but alternative forms of accountability are also possible.  
Furthermore, a system of governance that both effectively attends to people’s 
interests and is suitably accountable can certainly claim to have adequate 
democratic credentials.  I examine two models of democracy, an agency conception 
and an interest-based view.  While they both have strengths, I suggest that at the 
global level, we may often have good reasons to prefer an interest-based view, for 
example, when agency views fail to protect all the relevant interests.  We see also 
that a system of governance that both effectively attends to people’s interests and 
is suitably accountable can certainly claim to have good democratic credentials on 
the “Responsive Democracy” view I discuss. 
 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Brock 2009), and also, “Global Justice” 
(Brock 2008). 
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1. David Held’s model of Cosmopolitan Democracy 
Held's central contention is that the nation-state cannot remain at the center of our 
thinking about democracy.  Nation-states are situated in a world characterized by 
complex interdependence and power relations such that they are no longer always 
capable of guaranteeing democracy, autonomy, or sometimes even the basic 
wellbeing of their citizens.  Though nation-states still retain some power, 
transnational institutions, geopolitical processes, and market forces can be more 
significant in shaping the prospects for democracy in our world today.  There is no 
longer a symmetrical relationship (if such symmetry ever existed) between those 
who make political decisions and those who will be affected by those decisions.  
Local events can have devastating consequences for those very far away.  Regional 
and global interconnectedness create chains of interlocking political decisions that 
have consequences for state sovereignty.  For instance, the institutionalization of 
free markets through free trade agreements and monitoring organizations (such as 
the IMF and WTO), coupled with the fact that national governments are under 
pressure not to interfere with capital accumulation because investors might relocate 
to other markets where conditions are more favorable to them, seriously undermine 
individual governments’ abilities to improve conditions for their citizens unilaterally. 
Held reconstructs the account of democracy to allow for new features of the 
landscape.  For Held, above all, the ultimate justification for democracy rests with 
its promoting and enhancing autonomy.  Why should people support a central place 
for it in political theory?  A thought experiment along Rawlsian lines gives us Held's 
answer.  If people do not know what positions they might find themselves in during 
the lottery of life, they would choose "certain minimum levels of political 
opportunity and need-satisfaction" (Held 2005, p. 169).  They would also "define 
their good or interest in direct relation to the rules and resources that would be 
necessary for them to cooperate or compete fairly with others — subject to the 
limits of their life-plans and abilities — as equal members of their political 
community" (Held 2005, p. 169).  Asymmetries and deficits in life-chances would 
be rejected in a democratic thought experiment, so they are not justified according 
to Held. 
According to Held, democracy is only meaningful if citizens are able to be active as 
citizens.  Moreover, they are entitled to demand the pre-conditions for democratic 
participation, and these pre-conditions must be protected by various rights (Held 
2005, p. 190).  We need at least seven clusters of rights to enable free and equal 
participation in communities; namely, health, social, cultural, civic, economic, 
pacific, and political rights (Held 2005, p. 191).2  We need a constitutional structure 
and democratic public law to set out the rights and obligations that would derive 
from our commitment to the importance of democracy and autonomy.  This will 
have implications for many spheres of human endeavor but, notably, political 
intervention in the economy is warranted when it is needed to protect the basic 
requirements of autonomy.  Powerful economic organizations and relations can 
distort democracy in systematic ways.  We may regulate economic organizations 
and systems to ensure their anti-democratic effects are minimized.  New conditions 
need to be written into the ground rules governing free-markets and trade.  We 
should make a new Bretton Woods agreement that ties investment, trade, and 
production to the requirements for democracy.  Restrictions, penalties, and so forth 
should be imposed on those agents and organizations that do not satisfy the 
conditions specified for democratic autonomy.  Inducements, such as low interest 
rates, should be offered to attract investors into social investments that bolster the 
conditions for autonomy. 
                                                 
2 The right to physical and emotional well-being is identified as perhaps the most fundamental right of 
all. 
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Held’s preferred economic model is a democratized form of capitalism.  Market 
exchange still has a significant role to play in determining supply and demand, but 
there should be more scope for public deliberation and decisions about the aims 
and levels of public expenditure.  For instance, a 10% reduction in military 
spending in the developing world combined with a 1% reduction in military 
spending in the developed world would be sufficient not only to feed all those 
currently going without enough food, but would also make a significant contribution 
to ensuring that everyone has a basic education.  Making people aware of such 
possibilities, giving them an opportunity to debate priorities and express their views 
in referenda, might mean that current priorities will change.  Managing social and 
public investment in the conditions for autonomy would be undertaken publicly, but 
otherwise investment in economic sectors would be left to the private sphere and 
the market. 
The goal of international institutions and organizations should be to oversee 
democratic progress.  We need a new economic coordinating body because the 
current situation is one of fragmentation in policymaking that results from so many 
organizations (such as the IMF, World Bank, OECD, and the Group of Seven) having 
different briefs in making economic policy.  The key issue is to recognize the need 
for a new economic coordinating body, though we can still debate the details. 
Another important issue Held discusses is how we might democratize transnational 
institutions and decision-making.  He suggests various mechanisms that could help 
us approximate the ideal of democracy more closely.  These include making greater 
use of referenda and allocating public funding for deliberative bodies, such as a 
second chamber of the United Nations only for democratic nations in which 
representatives would be elected and accountable directly to democratic peoples.  
This body would initially be introduced to complement the General Assembly of the 
UN, but with the aim of replacing it in the long run.  He also believes we should 
create regional parliaments and governance structures (in places such as Latin 
America and Africa) and enhance the role of such bodies where they already exist 
(for instance, in the case of the European Union).  The decisions of these regional 
bodies could, in time, become recognized as having legitimate force for those 
regions (Held 2004, p. 112).  Furthermore, we should open up international 
governmental organizations (such as the WTO, IMF and World Bank) to public 
examination and agenda setting.  Such bodies should “be open to public scrutiny 
(on the basis perhaps of elected supervisory bodies, or functional deliberative fora, 
representative of the diverse interests in their constituencies), and accountable to 
regional and global assemblies” (Held 2004, p. 112).  He would also like to see the 
establishment of new organizations and mechanisms (where these do not exist or 
are weak) to address pressing environmental and social affairs, such as global 
poverty and welfare.  This is vital to counterbalance the asymmetry of power 
currently enjoyed by market-oriented agencies such as the WTO and IMF (Held 
2004, p. 112).   He also recommends the “enhancement of the transparency and 
accountability of the organizations of national and transnational civil society, 
addressing the potentially disturbing effects of those who are able to ‘shout the 
loudest’ and the lack of clarity about the terms of engagement of non-state actors 
with IGOs and other leading political bodies” (Held 2004, p. 112).   One more 
recommendation I mention here concerns security.  He suggests we develop law 
enforcement and coercive capacity to assist in dealing with serious regional security 
threats (Held 2004, p. 113).  This could be operationalized “if a proportion of a 
nation-state’s military were permanently seconded to a UN peacemaking force or if 
international enforcement capacities were increased by creating a permanent 
independent force recruited directly among individuals who volunteer from all 
countries, and who could be trained in an international military academy” (Held 
2004, p. 113). 
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 Held says: 
“...the cosmopolitan model would seek the creation of an effective transnational 
legislative and executive, at regional and global levels, bound by and operating 
within the terms of the basic democratic law ... Alongside the establishment of 
these bodies, the model anticipates the possibility of general referenda cutting 
across nations and nation-states in the case of contested priorities concerning the 
implementation of democratic law and the balance of public expenditure. ... In 
addition, the opening of international governmental organizations to public scrutiny 
and the democratization of international ‘functional’ bodies (on the basis perhaps of 
the creation of elected supervisory boards which are in part statistically 
representative of their constituencies), would be significant.  Extensive use of 
referenda, and the establishment of the democratic accountability of international 
organizations, would involve citizens in issues which profoundly affect them but 
which — in the context of the current lacunae and fragmentation of international 
organizations — seem remote.  These mechanisms would help contribute, thereby, 
to the preservation of the ideal of a rightful share in the process of governance, 
even in contexts where dispute settlement and problems resolution would inevitably 
be at some considerable distance from local groups and assemblies” (Held 2005, p. 
273). 
2. Nationalists’ concerns  
These suggestions have not found favour with nationalists.3  It is important to 
examine their concerns, as these are voiced about many other global democracy 
projects that make similar suggestions.  Will Kymlicka articulates one of the most 
instructive accounts of the nationalists’ worries.  While Kymlicka is apparently 
somewhat sympathetic to the rationale underlying Held’s project, he nevertheless 
identifies what appear to be some insurmountable problems with it.  In this section 
I discuss these. 
 Will Kymlicka accepts the following claims: 
1. We need international political institutions to deal with a variety of common 
issues, such as economic globalization, common environmental problems, 
and international security (Kymlicka 2001, p. 234). 
2. We can no longer take the nation-state as the “sole or dominant context for 
political theory.  We need a more cosmopolitan conception of democracy and 
governance” (Kymlicka 2001, p. 235) that addresses the sorts of issues 
articulated in (1).  We also need to make transnational institutions “more 
accessible and accountable to citizens” (Kymlicka 2001, p. 236). 
3. We must strengthen efforts to enforce human rights and “the rules for 
according international recognition to states should include some reference 
to democratic legitimation” (Kymlicka 2001, p. 323).  Each state should be 
encouraged to respect human rights and principles of democracy. 
Kymlicka does not believe that those views commit him to accepting Held's vision 
for a new global order, especially if this involves attempting to democratize 
transnational organizations or institutions.  According to Kymlicka (2001, p. 225), 
liberal democracy involves commitment to three distinct, though related, principles; 
namely, principles of social justice, deliberative democracy, and individual freedom.  
His view seems to be that all of these can be achieved best within national political 
units.  He adds that perhaps they can be achieved only in national political units as 
well.  He holds this view because, he argues, we need a high level of trust and 
solidarity before we are motivated to make sacrifices for one another.  If we are to 
fulfill our obligations of social justice by, say, engaging in redistributive practices 
that help needy citizens, there must be some sense of shared identity between 
donor and recipient.  When we look at history, we notice that people are willing to 
                                                 
3 By “nationalists” I mean, those who believe in the central importance of nations, though they may also 
have other ideological commitments, such as to liberalism as well. 
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make sacrifices for others only when they believe those people are “one of us” in 
some way.  There must be a shared sense of identity or shared membership of 
some group for us to be motivated to help other needy citizens.  Also, there must 
be enough trust that sacrifices made today will be reciprocated, should the need 
arise later.  Similarly, for authentic deliberation to be possible, there must be 
shared identity and trust: how else can we be confident that others will genuinely 
consider our opinions and interests?  Furthermore, a common language is also 
crucial: how else can we be confident that others will even understand us? 
Though Kymlicka recognizes the need for transnational institutions to deal 
adequately with a host of common problems, he is skeptical about the possibility of 
democratizing transnational institutions in a meaningful way and his consideration 
of Held's proposals confirm a pessimistic prognosis.  According to Kymlicka (2001, 
p. 239), the central problem with Held's position is that it “provides no real account 
of the preconditions which make... democratic political agency possible”.  
Nationhood provides the necessary solidarity and trust needed to sustain 
democracy and social justice.  As Kymlicka (2001, p. 240) sees it, the central 
problem is “how we can develop the sort of common identity and solidarity needed 
to establish and sustain this sort of cosmopolitan democracy”. 
Kymlicka believes there are some genuine transnational identities (for instance, 
those shared by members of Greenpeace or Amnesty International) but these fall 
short of the sort of collective identities necessary to underwrite broad-based 
solidarity, trust, and willingness to sacrifice.  Could we, perhaps, build on these 
collective identities?  Kymlicka does not believe so. 
“[D]emocracy requires us to trust, and to make sacrifices for, those who do not share our 
interests and goals.  The emergence of issue-specific transnational identities may explain 
why Greenpeace members are willing to make sacrifices for the environment around the 
world but it doesn't explain why Greenpeace members are willing to make sacrifices for, say, 
ethnocultural minorities around the world, particularly those who may demand the right to 
engage in practices harmful to the environment.  Democracy requires the adjudication of 
conflicting interests, and so works best when there is some sort of common identity that 
transcends these conflicting interests.  Within nation-states, a common national identity 
ideally transcends differences between pro-development and pro-environment groups, and 
enables some level of trust and solidarity between them.  It is difficult to see what serves 
this function at the transnational level” (Kymlicka 2001, p. 239). 
The worry, then, is that when we find ourselves in conflict over specific issues, we 
will have no underlying commonality that can help us work through our 
disagreement, so building on identities that emerge around particular interests 
cannot provide a solid foundation for common identity and, thereby, for conflict 
resolution.  Another option Kymlicka considers is to rely on existing national 
identities, by making international institutions more accountable to people through 
nation-states.  He does not believe this strategy is promising, since most states are 
not democratic.  A final option he considers is to try to increase the number of 
agents involved in deliberation; for instance, through having a second chamber of 
the United Nations, as Held recommends.  He is not optimistic about this strategy, 
because it has to confront the crucial problem of developing common identities to 
underwrite authentic deliberation.  His preferred model for realizing a more 
cosmopolitan conception of democracy is that we should hold international 
institutions accountable “indirectly, by debating at the national level how we want 
our national governments to act in intergovernmental contexts” (Kymlicka 2001, p. 
324). 
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3. Analysis of these concerns: do they undermine the prospects for 
Cosmopolitan Democracy? 
3.1. Shared identity, democracy, and justice 
We can summarise the key argument of the last section as follows: 
1. Common nationality or identity is the glue that makes solidarity and trust 
possible. 
2. Solidarity and trust are required for authentic deliberation. 
3. Authentic deliberation is necessary for genuine democracies to work 
properly. 
4. Nothing can take the place of common nationality at the international level. 
5. So, genuine democracy is not likely to be achievable at the international 
level. 
6. Held has failed to understand the preconditions necessary for functioning 
democracies. 
How plausible is this line of argument?  Does Held fail to understand the 
preconditions for democracy to work?  Held is certainly aware of at least some of 
the preconditions for democracy: recall his assertion that we need at least seven 
clusters of rights in order to enable free and equal participation in communities, so 
that meaningful political participation is possible.  It is not that Held fails to 
understand the preconditions for democracy to work, but rather, that Kymlicka and 
Held disagree over what preconditions are most central for democracy to be best 
advanced.  Do citizens most need to be able to communicate in the same language 
or do they need to be sufficiently autonomous?  Kymlicka prefers the former while 
Held prefers the latter.  Arguably, the considerations Held discusses are more 
fundamental to the ability to be an agent (let alone a political agent), so ensuring 
Held's conditions are met could be seen as more pressing. 
Another difference between Held and Kymlicka seems to revolve around what 
proper deliberation involves.  While they agree that a key element (perhaps even, 
the essence) of democracy involves deliberation among all who will be affected by a 
collective decision, they emphasize two different aspects.  Kymlicka concerns 
himself more with the content of the communication during authentic deliberation, 
while Held concerns himself more with setting up mechanisms for gathering the 
views of all who will be affected (advocating, for instance, public funding for 
international deliberative bodies and the possibilities for cross-national referenda).  
These two features are potentially in tension anyhow: the greater the set of 
deliberants, the greater the likelihood of imperfect communication.  Kymlicka thinks 
that, without a common language and nationality, the chances of authentic 
deliberation are reduced.  Held believes that without debate among a full set of the 
people who will be affected, we have not realized the democratic ideal sufficiently 
well. 
Recall Kymlicka's reasons for thinking that trust and solidarity, and hence common 
national identity, are crucial.  Kymlicka claims that if these are not present, people 
will not be willing to make sacrifices for each other and they will not be inclined to 
carry out their obligations of justice.  So, even if sacrifices are required as matters 
of justice, we simply will not be willing to do what is just.  Essentially, then, the 
worry seems to be that we will not be motivated to act responsibly toward people 
unless they are part of a common national team.  He appeals to "what history 
suggests" as evidence in support of his view (Kymlicka 2001, p. 225).  (I return to 
this appeal to the suggestions of history further on, since it cuts both ways.)  Here, 
then, Kymlicka's central claim is that we need a shared sense of team membership 
or we will not care enough to act responsibly toward non-nationals or non-citizens.  
One response cosmopolitans might offer to this suggestion is to present (or remind 
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people of) more arguments concerning why people should act responsibly toward 
non-nationals even when they do not feel like doing so.  There are plenty of such 
arguments, as I discuss elsewhere.4 
Another response to Kymlicka's argument is to challenge the assumption that we 
cannot extend the identities non-nationals share (that is, to challenge claim 4 
above).  We might do this by looking at the civic virtues and the thin identity he 
says holds citizens together, and examine whether these could be extended in 
scope, to create a more widely felt sense of a minimal shared identity. 
First of all, what is it that we would need to achieve for Kymlicka to be satisfied we 
had created the right sort of identity?  I turn to look at the account he offers of the 
civic identity necessary to sustain democracy.  According to Kymlicka, the health of 
modern democracies depends not only on how just its basic structure is but also on 
the characters and attitudes of its citizens.  Citizens need to show a certain amount 
of public-spiritedness; a sense of justice and "the capacity to discern and respect 
the rights of others, and moderate one's own claims accordingly;" (Kymlicka 2001, 
p. 296) civility and tolerance; and a "shared sense of solidarity or loyalty" 
(Kymlicka 2001, p. 296).  Also, social unity rests on shared identity.  He writes: 
“What then makes citizens in a liberal state feel that they belong together, that 
they are members of the same nation?  The answer typically involves a sense of 
shared history, and a common language.  Citizens share a sense of belonging to a 
particular historical society because they share a language and history; they 
participate in common social and political institutions which are based on this 
shared language, and which manifest and perpetuate this shared history; and they 
see their life-choices as bound up with the survival of this society and its 
institutions into the indefinite future.  Citizens can share a national identity in this 
sense, and yet share very little in terms of ethnicity, religion, or conceptions of the 
good” (Kymlicka 2001, p. 312).5 
If the identity Kymlicka talks about is all that holds us together, it is not clear why 
thin shared identities cannot be promoted globally, as identities of this kind 
certainly seem to be extendable beyond the nation-state.  Indeed, perhaps the 
items identified could prove to be the dimensions through which we could forge 
more of the collective identity Kymlicka thinks is needed.  After all, there is much 
shared history among the nations of the world, we do participate in various 
common social and political transnational institutions that reflect our shared 
history, and even if we are not very imaginative, we should see how our life-choices 
and, indeed, our very survival are bound up with international agreements and 
institutions into the indefinite future.  Moreover, if it is true, as Kymlicka (2001, p. 
234) repeatedly emphasizes, that sharing a sense of communal identity makes us 
more likely to fulfill our obligations of justice, and he recognizes that we have 
international obligations of justice, it must be that, by his own lights, it is very 
important for us to try to forge such identifications. 
                                                 
4 For instance, we could appeal to issues about what all humans are owed as humans, how everyone 
should have the prospects for decent lives and, importantly, how benefiting from unjust institutional 
schemes implicates us in them if no reasonable efforts at institutional reform are made.  See "Liberal 
Nationalism versus Cosmopolitanism: Locating the Disputes" (Brock 2002).  If Kymlicka supports public 
law or global human rights protection, he must be committed to some story about why we could impose 
this worldwide and we could perhaps remind him of his preferred story here. 
5 Notice some of the moral and social dangers with this view, even if it is true.  Since many recent 
immigrants and some national minorities do not share history, language, or institutions with fellow 
citizens, the view undermines social cohesion in multicultural societies.  Perhaps people who see only 
those who share their language and history as belonging together should overcome this limited 
perspective, because it excludes immigrants or national minorities who do not really share (or identify 
with) the dominant language or history.  So even if the claim is true, perhaps this is an important 
prejudice that needs overcoming: we should learn to extend our abilities to feel social unity with many 
who do not share either but live in the same political community as us.  As to the idea that citizens see 
their life-choices as bound up with the survival of their society, I wonder whether citizens’ preferences 
here just reflect a failure of imagination, if this is the outer limit of what they see as relevant. 
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Is lack of a common language in the international arena really a stumbling block?  
Can we create the necessary collective identity without a shared language?  It 
seems we must be able to do this, given Kymlicka's own reasoning.  According to 
Kymlicka, language increasingly defines the boundaries of communities, of who 
people identify as belonging to the same political community as themselves.  
Multilingual democratic nation-states must find a way to forge identities across the 
language barriers if they are to stay together.  If we can and should do this within 
states, why not across them?  Perhaps states have easy access to some other tools 
— common institutions and some shared history.  Yet, there is hardly a region of 
the world that cannot help itself to these as well.  Can we really find a part of the 
world that does not participate in any of the following: international trade, that is, 
either the production, distribution, or consumption of products made elsewhere; 
international air, road, train or sea traffic; international sporting contests, arts 
festivals, and cultural exchanges; rules governing the movement of people across 
borders; the diplomatic system; the international postal system; and so forth? 
Furthermore, wouldn't some of the civic virtues "spill over" from the learning 
context of the nation-state?  If we had really learnt virtues, such as, public-
spiritedness, a sense of justice, "the capacity to discern and respect the rights of 
others, and moderate one's own claims accordingly" (Kymlicka 2001, p. 296), 
civility, and tolerance, it is hard to see how these virtues would "be able to stop 
themselves" once the boundaries of nation-states had been reached.  If we properly 
have the virtues of (say) justice or "the capacity to discern and respect the rights of 
others, and moderate one's own claims accordingly" it is difficult to believe that we 
would fully have them within the nation-state but lose them entirely when the 
context is broadened.  In short, it is hard to see that Kymlicka's virtuous citizens 
(or the virtuous citizens of liberal nations) would be unable to transfer their virtues 
to an international arena. 
3.2. Is shared collective identity really necessary for authentic deliberation? 
Why does Kymlicka believe shared collective identity is necessary for authentic 
deliberation?  The following passage contains his typical line of reasoning: 
“[D]emocracy is not just a formula for aggregating votes, but is also a system of 
collective deliberation and legitimation.  The actual moment of voting (in elections, 
or within legislatures) is just one component in a larger process of democratic self-
government.  This process begins with public deliberation about the issues that 
need to be addressed and the options for resolving them.  The decisions which 
result from this deliberation are then legitimated on the grounds that they reflect 
the considered will and common good of the people as a whole, not just the self-
interest or arbitrary whims of the majority. 
 Arguably, these forms of deliberation and legitimation require some degree of 
commonality amongst citizens.  Collective political deliberation is only feasible if 
participants understand and trust one another, and there is good reason to think 
that such mutual understanding and trust requires some underlying commonalities.  
Some sense of commonality or shared identity may be required to sustain a 
deliberative and participatory democracy... there are good reasons to think that 
territorialized linguistic/national political units provide the best and perhaps the 
only sort of forum for genuinely participatory and deliberative politics.” (Kymlicka 
2001, pp. 323-4).6 
Does Kymlicka's reasoning imply that authentic deliberation at the international 
level is doomed?  Kymlicka may have described one dimension of what aids 
authentic deliberation, but there are others.  The following preconditions also aid 
authentic deliberation and are frequently jointly sufficient for it: first, we need an 
awareness and understanding of our collective problems, our interdependence, and 
                                                 
6 Though it may not look like Kymlicka makes much of the issue of shared identity in this passage, he 
certainly does elsewhere, for instance, p. 212, p. 214 and p. 239.  I selected this passage as it is a 
succinct summary of the whole argument I want to criticise here.  
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our vulnerabilities to events that occur in other nation-states; second, we need a 
commitment to try to work toward something that is collectively in our interests; 
and, third, we need enough shared values.  We can have whatever other more 
substantive identities we want, but these are not needed for authentic deliberation 
to occur.7  Moreover, within nation-states, similar preconditions are also needed.  
For instance, it is not enough to have a shared identity, since people may still not 
be committed to working out various problems, in which case authentic deliberation 
is not possible either.  Without sufficient understanding, commitment, and shared 
values as well, there can be no sustained authentic deliberation either; democracy 
then will not work and cannot function as a decision-making mechanism. 
Sharing a collective identity might, in some cases, be useful to sustain authentic 
deliberation, but it is not necessary.  All we really need is enough understanding of 
our situation, commitment to face our collective problems, and shared values.  So, 
if we can create sufficient understanding, commitment and articulate enough 
shared values, this will do the job that Kymlicka thinks can be done only by shared 
collective identity.  What about the issue that we will not be sufficiently motivated 
to make sacrifices for each other unless we have a shared identity?  If a solution to 
a global problem is urgent enough, we have sufficient shared values, and in the 
face of adequate leadership, we can create the necessary motivation.  We have 
these same problems at the domestic level too and must rely on their solution in 
the same way. 
Indeed, it seems that a collective identity, a too narrowly shared sense of "us," may 
prove to be an obstacle to working out solutions to global problems.  Arguably, it is 
just the sort of "we're a team and what's in it for us?" mentality that prevents 
national leaders from signing treaties that are in our collective interest (or worse, 
reneging on others, such as the Kyoto agreement).  Presumably Kymlicka would 
not accept that this sort of behavior necessarily follows from his view, and surely 
that is right.  But does his preferred model not encourage this way of thinking?  If 
he is fond of appealing to "what history suggests" in some contexts, he will have to 
accept that, in this respect, the historical facts suggest a strong connection 
between the division of the world into national decision-making units (coupled with 
a sense of national identity) and a tendency to act in the international arena in a 
way that favors national interests at the expense of considerations of justice and 
the global collective good. 8 
3.3 Can Held accommodate Kymlicka's concerns? 
As I read Held, he could agree with most of Kymlicka's criticisms, while preserving 
his cosmopolitan model of democracy.  Consider, for instance, these passages: 
 
1. “However cosmopolitan democracy is conceived, it is based upon the recognition that 
democracy within a particular community and democratic relations among 
communities are interlocked, absolutely inseparable, and that new organizational and 
binding mechanisms must be created if democracy is to develop in the decades 
ahead” (Held 2005, p. 236). 
 
2. "The establishment of a cosmopolitan model of democracy is a way of seeking to 
strengthen democracy ‘within’ communities and civil associations by elaborating and 
reinforcing democracy from ‘outside’ through a network of regional and international 
                                                 
7 To illustrate, solving the so-called Y2K problem did not require some shared identity for us to work out 
what needed to be done.  Nor does sorting out an international mailing system.  We notice that it is in 
our collective interest to have (say) a reliable mailing system and with enough commitment we can 
make this happen, because we share enough of the same values. 
8 It is worth noting that creating the necessary awareness, commitment, and shared values is a project 
that is already underway.  Witness, for instance, the attempts of the Global Commission as discussed in 
Our Global Neighbourhood (Global Commission 1995). 
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agencies and assemblies that cut across spatially delimited locales" (Held 2005, p. 
237). 
 
3. “It is possible to conceive of different types of democracy as forming a continuum 
from the local to the global, with the local marked by direct and participatory 
processes while larger areas with significant populations are progressively mediated 
by representative mechanisms.  The possibilities for direct participatory democracy in 
communities and workplaces are clearly extensive compared to those which exist in 
highly differentiated social, economic and political circumstances” (Held 2005, p. 
280). 
 
As I read these sorts of passages, there would certainly be considerable scope for 
debate in a shared language (or “in the vernacular”, as Kymlicka is fond of saying), 
both to decide local issues and to inform transnational debates. Representatives 
could communicate the views of their constituents, debate with fellow 
representatives on behalf of constituents, take views back to constituents to show 
how they should be modified in the light of pressing considerations made by others, 
and so forth.  Politics in the vernacular can still flourish, but, of necessity, 
representative democracy will have to play a role as well, because of the sheer 
number of people involved. 
Indeed, in some cases, democracy might be better furthered when mediated 
through representatives.  Representatives will probably be exposed to a greater 
range of viewpoints offered by others with very different perspectives and needs, 
and they might feel more pressure to agree to proposals or treaties (such as ones 
concerning human rights protections) even when these do not straightforwardly 
reflect the will of the people in their particular constituencies.  Just because 
something has emerged as the will of the people — the consensus view that is 
arrived at in politics in the vernacular — this is, of course, no guarantee that it will 
automatically further the cause of meaningful democracy (in the sense of 
promoting people’s basic interests or protecting their basic human rights).9  
Democracy is sometimes better advanced from the top down and at other times 
from the bottom up, depending on the content of a particular policy. 
A danger with Kymlicka's preferred model is that, in privileging deliberation at the 
national level and deciding there and only there how we want our national 
governments to act in intergovernmental contexts, it is too likely to lead to the sort 
of "us-first" mentality that seems to be typical of the way most governments 
operate in the world today.  For them, questions of "what's in it for us?" loom large 
and are, in practice, pretty much decisive.  If appeals to the empirical world and 
data are key, as I believe they are, what we need is persuasive evidence that 
bolstering the importance of national deliberation does not at the same time 
undermine global efforts to solve some of our pressing problems. 
My interpretation of Held's view, then, is that the people must govern themselves, 
but they must do this within a framework that makes meaningful democratic life 
possible.  Such a framework protects or establishes the necessary social, political, 
and economic conditions for citizens to engage in democracy.  Held believes that it 
is possible to recover a more participatory democracy at lower levels, which could 
complement some of the other more global changes.  Sometimes more 
participatory democracy at higher levels is possible too.  He envisages a political 
order composed of democratic associations including cities, nations, regions, and 
global networks.  He does not believe states or nations will become redundant, but 
he does think states should be "relocated within and articulated with, an 
overarching global democratic law” (Held 2005, p. 233). 
                                                 
9 I discuss this alternative model in more detail in the final section of this article. 
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Notice also that Kymlicka's central claim is about which forum is primary for 
genuine participatory democracy.  Kymlicka believes that "language-demarcated 
political communities remain the primary forum for participatory democratic 
debates, and for the democratic legitimation of other levels and forums of 
government" (Held 2005, p. 215).  They are primary because they are more 
genuinely participatory and this is where legitimacy is conferred through the 
consent of the people. 
Held could agree with the idea that language-demarcated political communities are 
the primary fora for genuine participatory democracy, but still urge us to do what 
we can to democratize other venues in which decision-making must take place.  
Democratizing international institutions might be complementary or even necessary 
to support the primary fora.  Held’s and Kymlicka’s claims on this issue could be 
made consistent.  Held might agree that decision-making in national communities is 
more genuinely participatory, but still insist that, given that "we can no longer take 
the nation-state ... as the sole or dominant context for political theory" (Held 2005, 
p. 235), perhaps we must give up some scope for genuine participation when we 
move to dealing with certain problems that have global reach, and also, where 
possible we should do what we can to facilitate genuine participation in all the fora 
in which democratic decision-making occurs. 
While their central claims about participation and democracy might be made 
consistent, Held and Kymlicka would still differ on whether national communities 
are the primary conferrers of legitimacy.  Held believes that, under the 
cosmopolitan democracy model, systems would enjoy legitimacy to the extent that 
they enacted democratic law, so direct consent of the people is not always 
necessary for all policies to have legitimacy.  Ideally, people would consent, but 
consent is not necessary for legitimacy in all cases.  Initially, cosmopolitan 
democracy requires the consent of peoples and nations — that is, the introduction 
of a democratic international order must be based on consent — but after that, "in 
circumstances in which people themselves are not directly engaged in the process 
of governance, consent ought to follow from the majority decision of the people's 
representatives, so long as they — the trustees of the governed — uphold 
cosmopolitan democratic law and its covenants” (Held 2005, p. 231). 
While there is room for some agreement between Held and Kymlicka, there are 
genuine differences too.  My aim in Section 3 has been to show first, that there are 
good reasons to side with Held in their debate and, second, that Kymlicka's 
criticisms and nationalist concerns more generally, are not yet devastating to the 
project of cosmopolitan democracy. 
 
4. Taking stock: What do we want from our global governance 
arrangements, anyhow? Does it matter whether they are democratic? 
We can assess global governance arrangements in terms of two main variables, 
which are sometimes in tension: effectiveness and accountability.  We want 
systems of global governance to incorporate both considerations.   A key aim of 
global governance should be to secure both.  If we have a system of global 
governance that is effective at promoting and protecting people’s interests and is 
accountable, does it matter whether or not it is democratic?  What model of 
democracy (if any) should be guiding reform at the global level, anyhow?  The 
latter, in particular, is an important question and one that deserves investigation.  
Fortunately, when we examine two central models of democracy we discover that a 
system of governance that both effectively attends to people’s interests and is 
suitably accountable can claim to have adequate democratic credentials on the 
Responsive Democracy account, as I go on to discuss. 
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Leading theorists in accountability, Robert Keohane and Ruth Grant (2005) define 
the term, thus: “accountability implies that some actors have the right to hold other 
actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their 
responsibilities in light of those standards, and to impose sanctions if they 
determine that these responsibilities have not been met”.  There are two central 
models of accountability: a ‘participation’ model and a ‘delegation’ model.  The 
International Criminal Court is an example of an accountability mechanism that 
does not involve participation, but rather the delegation of power to judges, 
lawyers, and other experts on legal matters.  An effective accountability system 
should combine elements from both the participation and the delegation models.  
So far, perhaps rather too much emphasis has been placed on the role of 
participation in legitimating governance.  There are often reasons to prefer the 
delegation model, for instance where (1) complex issues are at stake that require 
significant expertise and detailed knowledge of relevant factors, and (2) there are 
tensions between what is in our collective interest and yet might be so immediately 
unpopular that those who take bold but necessary action will be punished at the 
next election.  A clear example here might be a panel (comprised of scientific, 
economic, and other experts) empowered to formulate policy that has binding force 
in addressing the problem of global warming.  In all probability, the policies such a 
panel needs to recommend would involve significant costs to current generations 
(but ones that it may not be unreasonable to expect them to bear).  Would the 
existence of some panels empowered to make such decisions threaten the 
democratic credentials of our global governance arrangements?  In order to see 
why this would not be the case (indeed why failure to incorporate such features 
might threaten meaningful democracy), let us examine the much-promised two 
central models of democracy. 
As Daniel Weinstock (2006) argues in a recent paper, there are two conceptions of 
democracy discernible in practice and theory, which come to the fore when we ask 
about the point of global democratic reform.  On the first (and arguably dominant) 
model, global democracy is desirable because it would enhance political agency.  
Because human beings should be agents (rather than passive subjects) of their 
fates, more democracy at the global level should allow more participation in 
collective decision-making at the global level.  On the second account, realizing 
more democracy globally would be desirable because it would enhance the 
realization of people’s interests.  On the interest account (which I shall refer to as 
“Responsive Democracy”10), if you want to improve democracy at the global level 
you have to make it more responsive to people’s interests and make it better at 
securing people’s interests.  There are several reasons to think that if this is an 
important aim of democratic institutions, then it is not enough simply to give people 
more opportunities to voice beliefs about their interests.  We will need to 
supplement with institutions that correct several shortcomings that the agency view 
has.  These include: 
1. Cases of collective action problems.  These can occur when we identify 
situations that, though they are collectively rational for us to pursue, require 
the necessary assurance that others will be made to play their parts, if it is 
not to be more rational to act selfishly. 
2. The agency view does not always take account of all the relevant people 
whose vital interests will be affected, notably, future generations.  
Democratic institutions may enhance the agency of those adults who 
currently participate in the collective decision, however, those are not the 
only relevant agents that deserve our consideration. 
3. We may be able to identify our interests clearly enough, but be at a loss 
about how to design policies that will best realise those interests.  Examples 
                                                 
10 This is a term introduced by Andrew Kuper to describe a model not dissimilar to the interest-account 
Weinstock discusses.  See Democracy Beyond Borders (Kuper 2004). 
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include how to deal adequately with global warming, bird flu, or SARS.  For 
instance, we all can identify the interest in minimizing the impact of avian flu 
on humans (should it eventuate), however, there are a number of 
possibilities as to how this might best be achieved and it is not clear that 
without the necessary expertise the average citizen is best placed to make 
this decision.  (For instance, some experts argue that the best course is to 
emphasize isolation and other public health measures aimed at stopping the 
spread of the virus.  Others believe stockpiling and distributing antiviral 
medication would be best.  However, there are questions about the 
medication’s effectiveness, side effects, and whether distributing it would 
create more opportunities for the spread of the virus.  Deciding the best 
course of action would require more understanding of the issues than the 
average citizen is likely to have or be willing to gain.) 
Weinstock argues that if we look at real world institutions of democracy, we notice 
there are a “dizzying array” of practices and institutions that aim to better secure 
people’s interests when more agency-oriented democratic institutions fail.  
Examples abound in contemporary practice, which include these: schemes to 
ensure  
“forced saving (to counteract akrasia and ignorance of our long-term good), 
provision of public goods (to offset collective action problems), public insurance 
schemes, child protectors and environmental impact assessment mechanisms (to 
enact democracy’s commitment to the interests of all concerned by a given policy, 
including future generations), expert panels, auditors general, and the like.  These 
mechanisms complement democratic institutions’ ability to realize citizens’ 
interests, but they are not themselves democratic.  In fact, many of them are 
overtly paternalistic in their rationale and in their operation.  They protect certain 
interests, when necessary against the tendency of democratic decision-making 
procedures to ignore or overlook them” (Weinstock 2006, p. 9). 
Weinstock argues that actually existing democracies are better understood along 
the lines of the interest account.  Perhaps that is the fault of the world rather than 
the theory, but he does not believe so.  As all mature, modern democracies 
instantiate the interest account, there may be something theorists should learn 
from this practice.  If we want more global democracy because we want institutions 
to be more responsive to the interests of individuals than they currently are, we 
need to promote institutional forms that are appropriately mandated to protect 
people’s fundamental interests.  Ideally, we can realize both the agency and the 
interest conceptions of democracy at the global level, but there will sometimes be 
reasons to prefer the latter over the former, such as in the three kinds of cases 
concerning the agency conception’s shortcomings outlined above.11 
We might then categorize different officeholders by the ways in which they are 
connected to elections.  In mature democracies there are three ways in which 
individuals who are entrusted with political power are connected to the electoral 
process.  First, some officials are directly elected.  Second, some officials who have 
legislative power are selected by officials that are elected, for instance, judges on 
high courts and cabinet ministers.  Third, some officials are selected by officials that 
are elected, but have no direct legislative power.  In some countries these would 
include auditors general, ombudsmen, public health officials, ethics commissioners 
and commissions of inquiry.  We come, then, to appreciate several central tasks are 
performed in modern democracies by officials and institutions whose function is to 
                                                 
11 Moreover, at the global level, there are enormous issues concerning scale and the ability of individual 
agents to have meaningful input into effective policies.  In any case an agent might need to have 
absorbed much technical information before an informed decision can be made and we do not all have 
the time or inclination to devote to such a task.  Many of us are therefore happy to leave the job to 
others who will act on our behalf, so long as these others are adequately authorized and constrained 
(through, say, having to be made accountable in a robust fashion).  The link to authorization and 
constraint is important if our basic interest in avoiding domination is not to be threatened. 
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“protect citizens’ fundamental interests against the perverse consequences that 
more paradigmatically democratic institutions can sometimes engender” (Weinstock 
2006, 14).  It may be a good thing that such officials are not directly elected 
because it is important that some officials have partial independence from popular 
opinion to allow the integration into policy-making of a more dispassionate and 
temporally extended view of the public interest (though it may be important also 
that some connection with elections be maintained, albeit in some cases quite 
indirect). 
I imagine the biggest source of resistance to the idea of delegating responsibility for 
some decision-making to expert panels concerns abuse of power.  Is it reasonable 
to delegate authority to experts to make decisions on our behalf?  Why should we 
trust that experts will act responsibly?  In coming up with an answer to this 
question it is useful to consider that such issues already arise all too frequently in 
our complex societies and perfectly good mechanisms to ensure that trust is well 
placed have been developed.  Why, for instance, trust surgeons to act competently 
in performing operations?  It is reasonable to trust persons empowered to act in my 
best interests when there are adequate mechanisms in place to make such trust 
reasonable, such as rules governing an appropriate process of skills’ acquisition and 
accreditation, bodies that regulate professions, adequate opportunities to impose 
sanctions for inappropriate conduct, legal protections, peer scrutiny, appropriate 
reporting requirements, and so forth.  As Andrew Kuper notes, it is reasonable to 
place trust in certain others to act as good judges of our interests “when they have 
been adequately selected, empowered, and constrained” (Kuper 2004, 84).  
Furthermore, ensuring the separation of powers and clear demarcation of the 
domain of authority dramatically reduce the scope for abuse of power. 
It is worthwhile to note that the answers to the question of when it is reasonable to 
trust experts do not occur in a vacuum.  As Andrew Kuper observes in defending his 
account of responsive democracy: “the answers require detailed attention to 
institutional design.  But we can note that markedly similar questions have arisen in 
respect of the judiciary, and quite powerful techniques have been developed for 
keeping members of the judiciary fairly autonomous.  These include professional 
codes of ethics, long-term appointments, measures to prevent sacking by 
politicians, adequate salaries, clear criteria of selection, independent commissions 
of appointment, agreement from legislators on all sides, review by higher courts, 
and so forth” (Kuper 2004, 113). 
So we see, then, that key issues will be designing adequate mechanisms of 
accountability and attention to institutional design.  It is pleasing to note that there 
is already a rich literature developing in this area.12  The key to ensuring effective 
policies at the global level that can gain wide support from citizens is ensuring that 
decision-makers are held suitably accountable.   In this way we would truly have 
realized a more responsive and meaningful form of democracy.13 
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